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Abstract 
 
This honors thesis attempts to reconcile adaptive preferences (APs) with the autonomy of the 
oppressed. I thus investigate APs closely, a term used in the feminist philosophical literature to 
communicate a distinct feature of marginalized and oppressed people–the undue influence of 
systems of oppression on their preferences, decisions, and overall autonomy. I have aimed to 
situate this concept within a broader discussion of autonomy theory to get at the heart of this 
project: constructing an account that universalizes APs, one that asserts it as a phenomenon 
affecting people of all social locations. To better illustrate social positioning, I assert that all 
people are variously situated within any given dominant social imaginary; in this way, our 
agentive capacities are inherently tied to that social imaginary. My account thus puts forth 
necessary normative questioning to alleviate failures by theories to appropriately understand the 
oppressed person’s actions, preferences, and even compliance with oppressive norms. 
Simultaneously challenging the current application of APs, while also acknowledging the 
concept’s marked influence on the field of feminist ethics and autonomy theory, my account 
makes room for identities which shift, an intersectional perspective, a critique of the privileged 
who by way of their social locations often help maintain oppressive structures, and social 
resistance. The final portion of this project looks at competing accounts to answer a question of 
resistance and outlines specific examples of adaptive preferences held by the privileged person 
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Introduction  
 
 Feminist theorists have long attempted to capture a distinct problem of the oppressed: the 
ways in which their preferences are formed (or deformed) by the oppressive structures around 
them. What to make, for example, of the woman that has become so accustomed to her 
oppressive conditions that she adapts to them, or even finds herself to prefer them? Such 
preferences present challenges to feminist theory and praxis that wish to abolish these oppressive 
structures. Some philosophers and feminists have taken up as a matter of philosophical concern 
potential consequence of even theorizing about adaptive preferences (APs)–does it undermine 
the oppressed person’s agency? Does it make women out to be brainwashed “dupes of 
patriarchy?” (Narayan 2002, 418). 
I revise a definition of adaptive preferences by Serene Khader for this project–she 
proposes the term itself seems to suggest its problem: adaptive preferences “...are ‘adapted to’–in 
other words, ‘formed in reaction to’–social conditions” (Khader 2011, 74). In the philosophical 
literature, APs name something distinct about the oppressed experience and subjectivity, that 
sometimes the oppressive institutions that surround us do just that: they can corner us. However, 
I take issue with the way APs fail to account for the complex agentive capacities of the 
disadvantaged. Instead, what I propose is not a revocation of the concept, but an extension of it1–
because I do not take any claim that the oppressed person may adapt themself under an 
oppressive condition to be synonymous with any claim of self-diminishing, or retreating, or 
hallowing. In fact, it may very well be the very opposite. What I do argue, then, is that all 
people–those inhabiting advantaged social locations, or disadvantaged social locations, or both–
are shaped by their social environment in unique ways. 
This idea that humans are intricately formed by the frameworks, relationships, political 
environments, and institutions that surround us is not a new one; in fact, it is widely accepted. 
Take, for example, the lyric from Broadway’s Wicked: because I knew you, I have been changed 
for good. This sort of statement is reflective of the dialogical nature of human life, by which “we 
become full agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, [by] 
acquisition of rich human languages of expression” (Taylor 1994, 32). Notions similar to those 
found in pop culture also pervade public consciousness. Consider renditions of the aphorism: we 
become what we behold.  These observations show, in general, that people are sympathetic to the 
idea that who we are as individuals–including the decisions we make, preferences we hold, and 
thus, what we assume to be our autonomy–is formed, in part, by the social imaginary (Medina 
2013, 67). It is the project of this paper to argue that our agentive capacities are inextricable from 
our dominant social imaginary, and further, to direct this claim toward normative questioning 
about the agency of the oppressed. The focal point of this paper is adaptive preferences. The goal 
of this project is to universalize APs in order to develop a framework for an acceptable 
understanding of the oppressed person’s functioning under, or compliance with, oppressive 
norms.  
In §1, I define key terms, provide a survey of the philosophical literature on the relevant 
terms, and outline the general argument in favor of universalizing adaptive preferences. I bolster 
this argument by looking closely at the work of philosophers such as Serene Khader and Martha 
Nussbaum, and attempting to amend any potential shortcomings. I end section 1 by looking to 
one of Aesop’s fables and offering a reversal to further illustrate my argument in favor of 
 
1 This paper closely considers APs in the context of theory about oppression. For more about APs in the context of 
freedom and autonomy, see Jon Elster.  
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universalizing APs. In §2, I further explore the idea of APs as privilege maintenance, arguing for 
a conception of universal APs that understands the distinctions between those of the privileged 
and those of the oppressed. This is done most directly by connecting my account to Asha 
Bhandary’s concept of being at home. I also argue for a ‘wide’ conception of the social 
imaginary by referencing the work of Moira Gatens and Charles Taylor. The result is a plurality, 
recognizing numerous social imaginaries rather than just one. In this way, it is not synonymous 
with ideology, but instead a distinct concept to map the way people imagine their social 
environment. My focus on the dominant social imaginary, however–one closely tied to the 
structure of institutions and from which those in privileged positions derive the most benefits–
remains. This contributes to the larger goal in section 2 of drawing necessary distinctions 
between the adaptive preferences of the advantaged and disadvantaged. In §3, I look toward 
antiracist obligations by white people as I analyze competing accounts by José Medina and 
Shannon Sullivan. I offer an ameliorative conclusion by looking toward possibilities for 
resistance against APs by people in positions of privilege.  
 
(1) 
Adaptive Preferences and the Social Imaginary 
 
I understand social imaginary as José Medina defines it: “the repository of images and 
scrips that become collectively shared” and that “constitutes the representational background 
against which people tend to share their thoughts and listen to each other in a culture” (Medina 
2013, 67). Further, I see the social imaginary as a universal feature of human life–not in its 
effects, but in that it affects all humans. However, because I do not fully commit to answering 
questions such as, “Are there multiple social imaginaries?” and, if so, “How many?”, I instead 
focus on the dominant one. One could also plausibly use the term stratified to reflect its 
hierarchical nature. Section 2 defines the social imaginary with more detail. I define adaptive 
preferences as human preferences that are unconsciously informed by and shaped under the 
social imaginary. I reference concepts as being universal insofar as we might apply the concept 
inclusively, or to all humans regardless of social status. Because I understand the social 
imaginary as a universal phenomenon, I also understand adaptive preferences as a universal 
phenomenon. 
Nussbaum, in Women and Human Development, asserts that “international political and 
economic thought should be feminist, attentive (among other things) to the special problems 
women face because of sex” (Nussbaum 2001, 4). Nussbaum asserts that the best approach to the 
“idea of a basic social minimum is provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, 
that is, what people are actually able to do and be” (Nussbaum 2001, 5). In order to pursue this 
enterprise, she first acknowledges that “...unequal social and political circumstances give women 
unequal human capabilities” (Nussbaum 2001, 1). I agree with many of the underlying 
assumptions of Nussbaum’s project–especially that it is possible to “describe a framework for 
such a feminist practice of philosophy that is strongly universalist...” (Nussbaum 2001, 7); 
however, she fails to appreciate that adaptive preferences affect people across social status. 
Nussbaum’s chapter, “Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options,” begins with two 
epigraphs (Nussbaum 2001, 111):  
To those with low self-regard, neglect does not seem unjust...  
–Rabindranath Tagore, “Letter from a Wife” 
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When we see women like us who have done something brave and new, then we get 
the confidence that we can learn something new too. 
–Lila Datania, SEWA, Ahmedabad 
Using these epigraphs as an introduction to her understanding of adaptive preferences–
preferences that are deeply entrenched and often manipulated by tradition and intimidation–
seems supportive of my general argument upon first inspection yet fails to represent the 
important foundational element of universality. I will examine Nussbaum’s presentation of 
adaptive preferences and Medina’s presentation of the social imaginary more closely, and then 
explain why Nussbaum’s failure to universalize the concept is detrimental to her project. 
As imagined by Nussbaum, adaptive preferences developed by an agent are processual; 
they arise after “lifelong habituation” (Nussbaum 2001, 80). She offers the anecdote of a woman, 
like many women, who “seems to have thought [her] abuse was painful and bad, but still a part 
of women’s lot in life, just something women have to put up with as a part of being women 
dependent on men...” (Nussbaum 2001, 112). I think Nussbaum is right that we ought to take 
issue with this sort of preference, one that puts up with abuse; however, I think it is true that a 
parallel phenomenon can occur for the privileged person as well. This is not to say that adaptive 
preferences manifest equally between advantaged and disadvantaged groups2–rather it is to say 
that the dominant social imaginary is unavoidable This contributes to part of the necessity I find 
in involving adaptive preferences with the social imaginary.  
The “background against which people tend to share their thoughts and listen to each 
other in a culture” that defines Medina’s social imaginary is one that, I argue, mimics the 
structure of the prevailing, dominant institutions in a given society (2013, 67). Such a 
background thus has great bearing on the lifelong habituation Nussbaum references. How 
humans habituate or to what we become accustomed is necessarily married to that background, 
because it is the framework against which we come to understand ourselves and act as 
individuals. I do wish to make clear here that my argument is not to downplay the experience of 
oppressed groups (like women across the globe), but instead to strengthen the foundation of an 
argument which seeks to do the opposite–by both affording oppression the serious considerations 
it calls for and by avoiding undermining women’s autonomy.3 
I acknowledge the hesitations one might have in understanding adaptive preferences as 
universal, occurring across status and identity: might it do the opposite of what we seek to do? 
Might it undermine the disadvantages of oppressed peoples, especially women? These are valid 
critiques to consider; and yet, one still can–and ought to–understand the necessity of such 
universalizing by looking at the fluidity of status. Advantages and disadvantages are not static. 
For example, it is plausible that one may lose a privileged status, or gain it, across their life; in 
the same way, oppression may diminish or emerge anew. Of course, some disadvantages and 
privileges may be static, inextricable from unchanging identities or statuses; but given that many 
statuses can in fact change, or may constantly be changing,4 it seems logical that preferences 
might change in tandem. If someone who was once economically privileged suddenly becomes 
economically disadvantaged, we may assume that person’s preferences–as directed towards 
economic and social policy, or even what one prefers to spend their money on–would adapt in 
 
2 It is important to note that the privileged person’s APs are not born out of oppression, but out of privilege. 
3 For example, it seems to downplay women’s agentive capacities if one argues that women exhibit adaptive 
preferences and men do not (or, in other words, that women are adversely influenced by their social environment 
while men are not). 
4 Such as age, social class, location, ability, or religion. 
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their own favor. In the same way Nussbaum conceptualizes it for oppressed people, privileged 
people’s preferences may be also informed by tradition and in the interest of maintaining one’s 
privilege. 
Such universalizing also allows us to understand that a privileged person typically makes 
decisions and holds preferences which contribute to the maintenance of their privilege, and why 
these adaptive preferences can be harmful. Thus, understanding adaptive preferences as universal 
does not undermine the harms of oppression; instead, it acknowledges the social imaginary as a 
mechanism which often fosters epistemic vices in the privileged. José Medina identifies these 
vices in The Epistemology of Resistance: 1) epistemic arrogance, or a cognitive superiority 
complex; 2) epistemic laziness, or the “socially produced and carefully orchestrated lack of 
curiosity”; and 3) closed-mindedness, or an avoidance mechanism “systematically closed to 
certain phenomena, experiences, and perspectives” (Medina 2013, 33-34). He analyzes Harper 
Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird as an example of the sexist and racist social imaginary prevalent 
through much of American history which perpetuated these vices in the privileged and nearly 
precluded meta-lucidity.5 The dominant social imaginary in the novel resulted in maintained 
social hierarchies and varying preferences based on how those hierarchies interacted with the 
various situations of people.   
To revise Nussbaum’s account, we must go further than simply saying “people’s 
preference for basic liberties can itself be manipulated by tradition and intimidation,” (Nussbaum 
2001, 115). Instead, we might say people’s preferences may be also unconsciously informed by 
the hierarchies that reassure, encourage, and preserve one’s liberties and status. In fact, because 
the dominant social imaginary mimics the structure of institutions and those that live in a given 
culture–specifically the dominant group–all must be thereafter beholden to it in some respect. 
We thus cannot reasonably sustain an argument that the dominant social imaginary affects some 
more than others, or some not at all; instead, we can see that it has an influence on the people 
living under it in unique, complex ways.6 
As previously mentioned, the approach we ought to assume should entail taking issue 
with preferences that are clearly harmful so as to not underestimate the oppressed person’s 
oppression; recall Nussbaum’s anecdote of the woman who put up with marital abuse under the 
impression that it was simply her luck of the draw as a woman. To argue the social imaginary 
and adaptive preferences ought to be recognized as universal phenomena requires a discussion 
on whether or not adaptive preferences are harmful, and if so, when. This question is one that a 
number of philosophical accounts strive to answer. For the purposes of this paper, I will briefly 
outline elements of Serene Khader’s account, then explain how it might necessarily be changed 
to include both advantaged and disadvantaged peoples.              
Serene Khader shifts from the term adaptive preferences to inappropriately adaptive 
preferences (IAPs) to highlight the harm they cause; harm born from the fact that “because 
people have a tendency toward basic flourishing, IAPs are likely not their deep preference” 
(Khader 2011, 109). Khader’s work omits thinking about the privileged person and APs where 
there is space to do so; advantaged people are therefore excluded from having adaptive 
preferences or inappropriately adaptive preferences on her account. While I value Khader’s focus 
on how adaptive preferences are born out of social conditions (or as I imagine it, the social 
 
5 An epistemic virtue, the “capacity to see the limitations of dominant ways of seeing” (Medina 2013, 47). 
6 From this, it follows that the adaptive preferences born from a social imaginary have a similar nature–that each 
person’s preferences are informed by the social imaginary in complex ways, no one person uniquely dodging its 
presence.  
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imaginary) and think it not to be entirely at conflict with my account, her failure to ascribe the 
concept to privileged people is a potential harm to the disadvantaged. Without getting caught up 
outlining Khader’s account, I am compelled to revise her definition just as I would revise 
Nussbaum’s. Because I understand the social imaginary and adaptive preferences as universal 
social phenomena, I also argue that Khader’s understanding of adaptive preferences–
“nonconducive to basic flourishing”–could be plausibly universalized, too (Khader 2001, 42). 
That is to say: if the disadvantaged person’s preferences are nonconducive to their own 
flourishing, the privileged person’s preferences also tend to be nonconducive to the 
disadvantaged person’s flourishing.7 Along the same lines that Medina conceptualizes epistemic 
vices of the privileged, the privileged person’s adaptive preferences tend to work in their own 
favor.8 
Aesop’s “The Fox and the Grapes” is widely referenced by scholars writing on adaptive 
preferences. In the fable, the fox, craving grapes but unable to reach them, decides they are sour. 
This moral asserts that people often alter their preferences based on what is attainable and what 
is not; this fact is influenced by the positioning of both the fox and of the goods at hand. The 
fable, in its original form, may be understood in the context of Nussbaum’s anecdote where the 
fox may be likened to a woman, and the grapes may be likened to a marriage free from abuse. 
Because the woman, like the fox, is trapped with what she has, she simply assumes that her 
marital abuse is an acceptable, unchangeable part of a woman’s fate. However, as I have iterated, 
the action of assigning such a fable only to the oppressed undermines their autonomy as agents 
even further.  
A reversal of the fable shows how we might understand an advantaged person as having 
adaptive preferences, too, and further clarifies the ways adaptive preferences do not manifest 
equally from person to person. In such a reversal we might say the fox, knowing he is not a fan 
of grapes from previous encounters, yet having easy access to them, decides to eat them. In the 
original fable, it is clear the fox is being denied something that might contribute to his 
‘flourishing’ and, in this way, the fox may be likened to a disadvantaged person. In the revised 
version, the fox is simply making the choice to consume something because it is readily available 
to him; not because he is forced to, but because it is simply an option. This fox, then, may be 
likened to an advantaged person. Both versions display the fox as a distinct agent, and both 
versions demonstrate adaptive preferences at work at a micro-level. However, as I have argued 
it, the effects between the advantaged fox and the disadvantaged fox are unequal despite their 
both experiencing adaptive preferences in a similar context. In presenting two versions, I 
characterize both foxes at an agentive base-level in parsing how APs are uniquely at work for 
both. Thus, by my account, the disadvantaged fox gains some level of equality with the 
advantaged fox. While we still ought to recognize the differences that come from the foxes 
having to make distinct choices in distinct situations, we have first done the important work of 
 
7 I wish to emphasize this point and be clear it is not a claim that the oppressor is also harmed by oppression, which 
is a position many philosophers do take up. Also, I will not be switching back and forth between IAPs and APs, but I 
acknowledge the usefulness of Khader’s distinction and take its underlying argument to be true.  
8 However, the adaptive preferences of the oppressed person may be more of an attempt to make the best of the 
situation in which they live (See Uma Narayan’s bargaining with patriarchy (2002)). To make the distinction about 
who is being harmed as a result of an adaptive reference is to articulate the stratification of adaptive preferences 
under the social imaginary, while still accepting both terms allows room for the concept to be necessarily universal.8 
 Zupancic 7 
ascribing some level of equality to one’s capacities to exercise agency,9 and therefore, their 
identities as agents.   
 
(2)  
The Social Imaginary and Being at Home 
 
 In section 1, I created the space to think about adaptive preferences as privilege 
maintenance; this section explores the idea further. To make this argument, I look closely again 
at the dominant social imaginary as well as Asha Bhandary’s concept of being at home in the 
world (Bhandary 2020, 180). It is the project of this section to present a nuanced account of the 
social imaginary to assert the universal and hierarchical nature of adaptive preferences. It is in 
this way that I continue to draw important distinctions between the adaptive preferences of the 
advantaged and disadvantaged.  
 I draw heavily from Bhandary’s being at home, which she describes as the “state of 
affairs achieved through the dynamic interaction of a person with their social environment and 
intimate others. It is influenced by the ease with which a person can access a range of primary 
goods. It also includes our cherished relationships” (Bhandary 2020, 180). Because being at 
home relies, in part, on a level of intelligibility “from a particular kind of relation between the 
person and culture,” those who occupy privileged locations in the dominant social imaginary 
tend to experience being at home (Bhandary 2020, 180-81). It follows that these are also the 
people “with the most to lose from changes to their social form that bring about justice...” 
(Bhandary 2020, 183). Thus, the privileged person typically exhibits adaptive preferences which 
ensure the preservation of the occupied position. Questions remain regarding whether or not all 
preferences are adaptive.10 I do not fully commit to answering this question here but offer 
insights which may help one’s thinking about it.  
I will further develop my account of the social imaginary by referencing work by Moira 
Gatens and Charles Taylor to argue for a ‘wide’ conception: not a social imaginary, but 
numerous social imaginaries, so that it is not synonymous with ideology but instead a distinct 
concept to map the way people imagine their social environment. Still, my focus on the dominant 
social imaginary–one closely tied to the structure of institutions and from which those in 
privileged positions derive the most benefits–is a way in which I am able to draw necessary 
distinctions between the adaptive preferences of the advantaged and disadvantaged. Especially 
salient from Chela Sandoval’s work is her differential consciousness, or the subject position that 
allows one to function “within, yet beyond, the demands of dominant ideology” (Sandoval 2000, 
43). Key terms defined in the previous chapter remain relevant here.  
 Bhandary outlines being at home in order to deploy a “typology of men in patriarchy” 
(Bhandary 2020, 180). She notes the phenomenon is brought about through “the dynamic 
interaction of a person with their social environment” but, for the purposes of this project, I 
revise this definition to replace “social environment” with Medina’s social imaginary. Bhandary 
asserts that culture determines the “social significance of actions and ways of life, and thereby 
 
9 I do not wish to make a claim about equality of people’s capacities to exercise autonomy, as I think these 
capacities are more complex than can be fully explained here. However, the role my reversal of Aesop’s fable plays 
is still important because it, at the very least, unearths the role APs play in the decisions and preferences of both 
advantaged and disadvantaged people.  
10 While the dominant social imaginary could have an overarching effect on a person’s whole self, I later discuss 
ways people may resist the dominant social imaginary. 
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mediates between individual persons and the bare bones of the distributive [care] arrangement” 
(Bhandary 2020, 180). Because the social imaginary is the “repository of images and scripts that 
become collectively shared,” (Medina 2013, 67) and against which we communicate and are 
connected in a culture, it is necessarily tied up in the conversation on intelligibility and being at 
home. In addition, Bhandary notes that one does not need a static culture to experience this state 
of affairs. This idea is supported by my claim that identities and cultural investments can change 
and thus preferences adapt. Instead, one needs some “valued relationships with others and a level 
of intelligibility...” (Bhandary 2020, 180-81). As a social imaginary is what connects people in a 
given culture, intelligibility depends especially on the dominant social imaginary. It follows that 
because people are variously situated within the dominant social imaginary, there is a 
stratification of intelligibility and of being at home. These stratifications bolster my claim that 
the privileged person typically makes decisions and holds preferences that maintain their 
privilege.  
According to her account of intelligibility, Bhandary argues that “everyone in a social 
form has a basic investment in that social form” (Bhandary 2020, 185). This includes women in 
patriarchal societies. Rather than borrow from Raz’s account of the social form, as Bhandary 
does, I replace the term once again with social imaginary. Bhandary uses social form to 
summarize the “context in which people live, including both institutional arrangements and 
culture” (Bhandary 2020, 185). Medina clarifies the social imagination’s interaction with 
epistemic sensibilities to ultimately argue that the imagination can be utilized in a way to “make 
people stronger and able to resist” (Medina 2013, 252). This is consistent with the work of Moira 
Gatens, from whom Medina borrows. Gatens argues that social imaginaries ‘link up’ to “display 
disconcertingly similar patterns” (Gatens 1995, xi). The result, however, is not necessarily a 
cohesive and intelligible whole; instead, the differing sociabilities “jostle against each other,” 
creating and illuminating paradoxes, and presenting “opportunities for change and political 
action” (Gatens 1995, xi). Gatens’ work is important in the room it makes for the privileged 
person committed to resisting the epistemic vices I outlined in chapter one.  
 For an account which depends so heavily on a concept of a symbolic social dimension of 
the world, there must be an elaboration on its scope. Here, I take on Gatens’ approach to use 
‘imaginary’ in an open yet “technical sense,” in order to reference the images, tropes, symbols, 
scripts, and other representations “which help construct various forms of subjectivity” (Gatens 
1995, viii). Here I ought to iterate that, while adhering to a plural account in which there are 
numerous social imaginaries, I still focus my attention on the dominant imaginary to illustrate 
the variously positioned subjectivities formed within it. Charles Taylor argues that what makes 
the social imaginary interesting is its being “shared by large groups of people, if not the whole 
society” (Taylor 2002, 106). Taylor’s emphasis on imagining (and focus on the dominant) help 
make clear why the social imaginary is preferable as a term. Medina also illustrates this point 
when referencing Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. The epistemic vices (or the resistance to 
know) that the famous novel’s jury demonstrate come “from the social imaginary.” In this 
context (1930’s Alabama), the dominant social imaginary circulated racist images, scripts, and 
tropes, thus producing active ignorance. Those most likely to be influenced by that social 
imaginary were those “raised under the influence of these imaginations and the cultural 
representations they produced” and, as I argue, those with the greatest investments in that 
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dominant social imaginary (Medina 2013, 68). This section of Medina’s book is particularly 
relevant to the plural account in that it emphasizes one dominant social imaginary.11  
Bhandary notes that Raz’s account of social forms ultimately “underestimates the 
prevalence of innovation, dissent and resistance” (2020, 187) within them while this is a front, I 
argue, on which Medina is successful. So, while I argue that the person inhabiting privileged 
locations in the social imaginary is more likely to adapt their preferences toward those which 
maintain their privilege, there is not hope lost for resistance. As iterated in section one, moving 
towards meta-lucidity to fulfill epistemic obligations requires improving both self-knowledge 
and knowledge of others, and within my account, the social imaginary is a place in which to do 
both.  
In order to illustrate the concept of cultural investments and stakes, and being at home, 
Bhandary references Ahmadi Lewin’s study of Iranian immigrants in Sweden. Lewin’s work on 
identity crises and integration shows that Iranian women adjust to Western societies with more 
ease than Iranian men. This is reflective of the notion that those in privileged locations within the 
social imaginary have greater investments within their culture, and thus, more to lose. For 
Iranian women, leaving one’s culture still involves abandoning investments in that culture, yet 
they are more likely to overcome identity crises in their new environment. The identity crisis is 
spurred from a loss of inner integrity as a result of “a discrepancy between the dominant culture 
and the culture internalized in the individual,” and the individual’s failure to identify with the 
“social groups or classes in the new society” (Lewin 2001, 123). Bhandary transitions to 
imagining a social form change in the United States–one where men are expected to “discern the 
care needs of others” (Bhandary 2020, 191). Such changes she notes as unavoidably disorienting, 
but for those in the disadvantaged position, there is more to gain. I find it significant to note that 
having more to gain from changes in the dominant social imaginary ought not be equated with a 
lack of cultural investments–Bhandary avoids making this mistake when she notes earlier in the 
chapter that all have some basic investment in their cultures. Serene Khader’s kinship harms is 
especially reflective of this notion.  
Khader identifies the weakening of existing kinship forms as a type of harm through 
“imperialist associational damage” (Khader 2019, 55). For women, changes in kinship structures 
can injure their wellbeing. This is one example of the loss Iranian women in Lewin’s study may 
have faced after immigrating to Sweden; yet, compared to their new access to primary goods, 
work status, and thus social position, their transition was completed with more ease than the 
men. The social imaginary may be used to complicate the way we understand the disoriented 
person, the woman faced with changes to her kinship structure. While the woman may be better 
off than the man as a result of her new-and-improved access to primary goods, the harms she 
faces as a loss of kinship and previous investments has to do with the imagination. To better 
understand the disorientation experienced by those who face major changes in the social 
imaginary, the concept itself needs to be able to illustrate the various situations people occupy 
within it. 
 Taylor argues for an understanding of the social imaginary that is broader, extending 
“beyond the immediate background understanding that makes sense of our particular practices” 
and including the relationships one has with others, how one got to where they are, and how one 
relates to others (Taylor 2002, 107). The limits of this wide conception are unclear, unstructured, 
 
11 I am still inclined to believe that social imaginaries separate from yet like the dominant are multiple–but the fact 
of a dominant social imaginary does not preclude the possibility of a social imaginary, somewhere, dedicated to 
antiracism.  
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and inarticulate. Taylor openly admits these things, arguing it is within that understanding where 
“particular features of our world become evident” (Taylor 2002, 107). Taylor uses the example 
of organizing a demonstration. If one pursues organizing a demonstration, the act itself is already 
in the actor’s repertoire. The ritual and social norms are understood (assembling, picking up 
banners, marching), and the “background understanding” is what makes the act possible; yet, 
“part of what makes sense of it is the picture of ourselves as speaking to others to whom we are 
related in a certain way...” (Taylor 2002, 108). I argue that the idea Taylor is propelling–a 
dynamic between practices and one’s relationships with those around them–is key because it 
includes the component of imagining. This imagining, or the ability to see oneself performing 
some action, is contingent on Taylor’s wide view, as defined above. Taylor concludes that “we 
can see here how the understanding of what we’re doing right now (without which we couldn’t 
be doing this action) makes the sense it does because of our grasp on the wider predicament: how 
we stand in relation to others and to power,” alongside time and space (Taylor 2002, 109).  
Taylor’s widened view helps us understand and do the important work of differentiating 
between the adaptive preferences of both advantaged and disadvantaged peoples. On this view, 
an argument may go like this: if, by way of her location in the dominant social imaginary, a 
woman is unable to imagine herself performing some action based on a broad interpretation of 
power structures and her relationships with others, it is within those boundaries that she is likely 
to act and develop preferences. The privileged person, having easy access to a range of primary 
goods, experiencing being at home in the world, will have much less difficulty imagining himself 
in a number of preferable scenarios. This logic also illustrates why changes to the social 
imaginary are so disorienting for the privileged person; not only has he lost access to goods to 
which he is accustomed, but he has never before–through the collective tropes, images, and 
symbols provided by the dominant social imaginary–been forced to imagine himself in such a 
scenario. It is precisely in this way the privileged person’s preferences and actions tend to be 
adapted toward privilege maintenance. Using the same lens, the Iranian woman who has 
immigrated to Sweden may also be better understood. The disorientation she experiences as a 
result of changes to her kinship structure is reflected by the idea within the wide view that her 
ability to understand herself in relation to others and power structures has also been altered. 
Thus, the wide view opens up ways to analyze both the advantaged and disadvantaged person, 
while necessary drawing distinctions between them.  
Chela Sandoval’s work on the methodology of the oppressed can be joined with Taylor’s 
wider social imaginary view in order to characterize women within patriarchal societies as 
agentive, even performing resistance. Her concept of differential oppositional consciousness, 
otherwise known as mobile subjectivity, references the subject’s ability to interpret power 
dynamics in differing scenarios and then tactically commit to different identities best suited to 
push back against those dynamics. This ability to interpret power dynamics is included in 
Taylor’s wide view. Borrowing from Anzaldúa who writes on the “weaving ‘between and 
among’ oppositional ideologies,” Sandoval identifies such a mode of consciousness as the 
‘differential’ (Sandoval 2000, 57). This mode, she says, “functions like the clutch of an 
automobile, the mechanism that permits the driver to select, engage, and disengage gears in a 
system for the transmission of power (Sandoval 2000, 57). In this way, and made clear through 
Sandoval’s language, the differential “depends on a form of agency that is self-consciously 
mobilized in order to enlist and secure influence” (Sandoval 2000, 57). This example, where the 
subject is an agent with the permission to “select, engage, and disengage,” is relevant here 
specifically for its ability to characterize women or otherwise disadvantaged peoples as agentive 
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(Sandoval 2000, 57). Uma Narayan’s concept of bargaining with patriarchy simultaneously 
reflects Sandoval’s mobile subjectivity insofar as they both understand woman as “avail[ing] 
themselves of whatever room they have to maneuver” (Narayan 2002, 422). The use of 
maneuvering in Narayan’s account is complicated by Sandoval’s argument that women learn 
which identity best suits them in a given situation. Thus, some women12 in patriarchal societies 
adapt their preferences in various circumstances, amplified by the dominant social imaginary, yet 
do so out of their agentive capacities, against the wide view Taylor developed.  
Because Taylor’s view includes knowledge of things like the relationships one has with 
others, how one got to where they are, and how one relates to others, the social imaginary 
(dominant or otherwise) includes space for the mobile subjectivity of the oppressed–and even 
resistance by the privileged as outlined by Medina. This knowledge comes about, in part, by way 
of the experience (or lack thereof) of concepts described earlier, like intelligibility and being at 
home in the world. Part of the process of moving towards meta-lucidity and learning to see past 
the dominant ways of seeing requires improving both self-knowledge and knowledge of others–
my account functions as a sort of meta-space where the privileged, who have stronger 
obligations to meet but often fail to meet them, might be able to see multiple groups (themself 
and different others) up against the same social imaginary (Medina 2013, 187). Then, work 
towards developing knowledge of the self and others in fulfilling epistemic obligations may 
occur. To deny adaptive preferences are universal is to refuse the oppressed some equal footing 
they might possibly have with the privileged while a great amount of equality is already 
precluded through their oppression. It is to say to them: your equal status depends solely on 
something you cannot control. Furthermore, for the privileged person to say to the oppressed 
person, I understand the decisions you make are informed by a detailed complex of social 
investments and contexts born from the dominant social imaginary, and that they are nonetheless 
agentive decisions, is meaningful, but is so much more so when he also acknowledges his own 
decisions are also informed by the dominant social imaginary–and that what they share in 
common is not necessarily what they face under that social imaginary, but the ability to adapt 
their preferences and decisions to suit themselves within it. It is precisely this sort of thinking 
which leads to a framework dedicated to avoiding women’s or any disadvantaged person’s 
agencies being undermined. 
 
(3)  
What Are White People to Do? 
 
I wish to conclude this project on a promising note. I have set out here to sketch an 
outline to better understand the agency of differently-situated people in an unequal world, and 
that there are moral obligations some people thus have as a result. These obligations, though, 
with the help of my account, imply something I find hopeful: that there is room for resistance. I 
take this to be one of the great projects of feminist and antiracist philosophy–asking (and aiming 
to answer) what people in positions of privilege can do to resist and help eradicate injustice and 
oppression. In this section, I look toward this question as a white woman, and examine 
competing accounts in order to better explicate the place of the social imaginary and APs as 
spaces for resistance. As Shannon Sullivan indicates in her introduction to Good White People, 
the question is complicated–even asking it assumes white people can do something, which some 
 
12 I wish to clarify that I say “some women” rather than “all women” intentionally and because of considerations of 
intersectionality. There are clear differences in adaptation between different women. 
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would disagree with. To that end, this paper will analyze two differing accounts which attempt to 
address this question–that of Shannon Sullivan and that of José Medina–to get clear on what sort 
of prescription for white people is the most fruitful.13 In adopting Medina’s prescriptions, I will 
continue to highlight APs to argue for the ways white people can resist one specific realm of the 
self that tends to perpetuate asymmetrical social standings.14 
 I want to briefly acknowledge the scope of this section. Political philosophers have 
argued a myriad of ways white people can do their part to resist and diminish racial injustice. 
Here, however, I only wish to explicate how white people can specifically resist their own 
adaptive preferences which uphold and reinforce asymmetrical social standings; in other words, 
this section is not a catch-all. White people have a lifetime of learning and unlearning to foster 
antiracist sensibilities in as many spheres of the world and self as possible. To me, the concept of 
APs is an acceptable place to start because of the way it situates the problem at the individual 
level yet reveals its effects at the institutional level. This is to say that those occupying privileged 
positions in the world tend to reap the benefits of a society that favors them and disfavors 
different others. Thus, the preferences of the privileged person tend to reflect and serve their own 
privilege-maintaining purposes. I also think conceptualizing asymmetrical social relations in this 
way is beneficial for how it illuminates some injustices that may be difficult to see otherwise 
(and this, too, is a great project of antiracist philosophy) for preferences are often harbored 
privately.  
 Medina argues for the ways in which the social imagination can be utilized to “make 
people stronger and able to resist” (Medina 2013, 252). He acknowledges that the imagination 
can “sensitize or desensitize people,” that it can “make people feel close or distant to others–and 
even to aspects of themselves,” and “create or sever social bonds, affective ties, and relations of 
empathy or antipathy, solidarity or lack of solidarity” (Medina 2013, 252). But, Medina asserts, 
there are still resistant ways of imagining that “can contest exclusions and stigmatizations” 
(Medina 2013, 252). This is because the imagination is an “exercise,” one which includes taking 
up perspectives, inhabiting spaces, and relating to others–in ways that link to our actual world. 
To Medina, it is in this way we can establish “a bridge between our world and other possible 
ones” and, I would argue, make the cognitive room for other possible worlds, even before such a 
bridge (2013, 255).  
Imagining is also double-sided. Medina borrows from Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000), 
asserting that regardless of how realistic or unrealistic fiction may be, “there are always some 
relations between the fictional worlds we imagine and our actual worlds” (Medina 2013, 255). In 
other words, there are things we can export from our real world into our fictional world, and 
things we can import from the fictional world into our real world. Medina likens this idea to a 
bridge again where the traffic can be problematic in both directions: “we may not want to import 
things from the fictional scenario into our world...and, on the other hand, we may also not want 
to establish an imaginary world by exporting alleged phenomena and relations that we do not 
accept as existing in our world” like, in the case of this paper, racial injustice (Medina 2013, 
255). Just as Medina argues throughout his book for the imperative of epistemic interaction, the 
imagination can be engaged in ways that procure epistemic counterpoints and thus “a venue for 
 
13 “Fruitful” may be taken a number of ways, but here I specifically mean reasonable and actionable given the nature 
of racism as an injustice affecting real, physical people who interact with real, physical others in a real, physical 
world.  
14 Including APs in such an analysis also bolsters my claim that Medina’s prescriptions may be more fruitful than 
Sullivan’s because his account can adequately address them while Sullivan’s cannot. 
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moral and political learning” (Medina 2013, 256). In other words, people in positions of 
privilege have an obligation to assess the boundaries of our imaginations, “interrogate the limits 
of our imagination and identify where imaginative resistance lie so as to become able to control 
it, instead of being controlled by it” (Medina 2013, 256). One of the ways to do this is by making 
room for new perspectives by having meaningful engagements with different others. Comparing 
and contrasting imaginative resistances lends itself to developing sensitivity to other ways of 
imagining and inhabiting worlds as well an increased self-awareness of the ways oneself inhabits 
the world. I want to clarify here that this methodology is not perfect–there are explicit racists and 
white supremacists who would not develop a sensitivity to different others by engaging with 
them. I argue–and it is likely Medina would, too–that the groups most productive to focus on 
here are those who may contribute to racial injustice (especially through APs), but 
unintentionally. Sullivan’s language of the good white liberal may be useful for getting at the 
type of group I wish to reference here. Identifying the limits of one’s imagination and capacities 
for resistance also allows one to get clear about one’s social positioning in relation to others, and 
thus understand the ways one’s preferences may be formed in reaction to the dominant repository 
of images, scripts, and tropes that circulates in any given society. 
 Medina differentiates between two senses of epistemic imaginative resistance: 1) at the 
object-level, with respect to the content of what he calls hot counterfactuals, or imaginings 
where our affective moral and political commitments are engaged (such as an idea “that a black 
woman would behave in a particular way”); and 2) at the meta-level, where we can exercise 
resistance to a way of imagining that “targets a whole perspective or frame–for example, looking 
in the world through the lenses of white supremacy ideology” (Medina 2013, 257). On my view, 
part of why these possibilities for resistance make sense is because they make space for 
scrutinizing the self. Medina develops an account where privileged people, those who “have 
more or stronger epistemic obligations given the epistemic advantages they enjoy” but often fail 
to meet these obligations, can learn what work is necessary for moving towards meta-lucidity–
seeing past the dominant ways of seeing (Medina 2013, 187). In doing so, the room made for 
increasing knowledge of the self and others is also room made for coming to understand one’s 
preferences in the context of the social world. Medina’s move from imaginative resistance to 
resistant imaginations marks the difference between isolated reactions and a more structural 
phenomenon, something that “requires social support and practices of interaction” (Medina 
2013, 257). These terms make clear what it takes for white people to live up to their obligations 
under oppression, to utilize their imaginations as resistance to APs that sustain asymmetrical 
social standings, but the answer is not so simple; yes, it requires an understanding of oneself and 
others, which is made possible by having meaningful, sustained interactions with different 
others, but to Medina, it also requires that our imagination becomes pluralized, polyphonic, and 
experimentalist. For the purposes of this paper, I will not be including instructions offered by 
Medina for attaining these features, but will agree that they are necessary and appropriate for an 
actionable account outlining white people’s epistemic obligations.  
 I will now look to Shannon Sullivan on the matter of what white people ought to do in the 
name of antiracist efforts to bolster the claims for resistance I have vied for thus far. Shannon 
Sullivan has, in the introduction to her book, Good White People: The Problem with Middle-
Class White Anti-Racism,15 explored the sly realities of racism in America, as well as put forth a 
 
15 While not directly related to the project of this paper, I would like to acknowledge the salience of language in 
Sullivan’s book: the idea of the “good white liberal” gets at something culturally relevant and important, which a 
number of other terms in modern discourse (especially on social media) broach as well. Some terms that come to 
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call-to-action: white self-love. Sullivan argues that love is an affect “that binds a person to that 
which she loves” (2014, 9). So, for the white person who has self-love, they may circumvent the 
distancing16 that white people tend to have towards their whiteness. Sullivan says, “I will argue 
that rather than try to create distance between themselves and their racial identity, white people 
need a closer, more intimate relationship with it if they are going to be effective in racial justice 
movements” (9). Sullivan also argues that love can require a sort of criticism, that it can often be 
discontent, and thus that a white person’s loving themself as a white person “means 
critically...caring enough about the effects whiteness has in the world to work to make it 
something different and better...” (2014, 10). While Sullivan gets at something key here, I am 
inclined to note what might be lost in looking strictly at the white subjectivity.   
Medina simultaneously analyzes the possibilities of the oppressed person’s subjectivities 
and perspectives side-by-side with those of the privileged person’s; this is significant because the 
methodology avoids the problem of looking only at those perpetuating injustice to determine 
how we might ameliorate it. Sullivan even addresses the issue that might arise otherwise: “if part 
of the problem of white privilege is that white people always see themselves as the rightful 
center of attention, then focusing on white people would only seem to perpetuate, rather than 
challenge white privilege” (2014, 17). I argue that the problem may not be focusing on white 
privilege in general, but on focusing on the perspectives and points of view of white people 
while attempting to address the injustices born out of white privilege. This is one of the core 
issues Medina confronts in his book, for it is unfair to determine how white people can perform 
resistance to oppression by their own standards–people in positions of privilege typically don’t 
have to expand their knowledge to include others around them in the way that the oppressed 
do.17 
Even as Sullivan defends a conception of white self-love that can experience 
discontentment, that can see the systemic harms procured by whiteness, she fails to acknowledge 
the situations and subjectivities of non-white people, which seems essential to any criticism on 
white racism and prospects for developing knowledge of different others. Where Sullivan says 
one way for white people to resist ontological expansiveness18 is “for them to stay home, so to 
speak, rather than travel to other racial locations” (2014, 20), Medina says white people need a 
“transformative but not shattering lucidity,” one that allows subjects to “see how their whiteness 
has been constructed socially and historically vis-á-vis other identities” and at the same time that 
“points in the direction of new ways of inhabiting that identity” (2013, 220). He outlines how to 
move towards a kaleidoscopic consciousness for genuine open-mindedness, a consciousness that 
“remains forever open to being expanded” (2013, 224). It seems, by Sullivan’s account, white 
people can garner self-knowledge and scrutinize whiteness in isolation, by way of “stay[ing] 
home,”19 (2014, 20). 
 
mind include: being ‘woke,’ being a ‘social justice warrior’ (SJW), and being ‘politically correct’ (PC; people may 
be referenced as the ‘PC police’). The project at hand, to break down this guise and reveal truths about the “‘good’ 
white people whose goodness is marked by their difference from the ‘bad’ white people who are considered 
responsible for any lingering racism in a progressive society,” is a necessary and long-overdue one (2014, 3).   
16 This distancing may be likened to Medina’s concept of active ignorance, born out of epistemic vices: epistemic 
arrogance, epistemic laziness, and closed-mindedness. 
17 Recall the concept of meta-lucidity.  
18 Defined by Sullivan as “the habit, often unconscious, of assuming and acting as if any and all spaces–
geographical, psychological, cultural, linguistic, or whatever–are rightfully available to and open for white people to 
enter whenever they like” (2014, 20). 
19 I assume this is metaphorical rather than literal. 
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I acknowledge the potential concern–one Sullivan presents–for only propagating 
ontological expansiveness with a prescription, like Medina’s, of sustained interaction with 
others. My response is that this is different from ontological expansiveness in that the expanse 
being unfurled is one that engages and makes room for new perspectives, not the perspective of 
the white self. It may still be a concern that white people only exploit the resources and social 
labor of people of color when they “travel to other racial locations” to learn about the harmful 
effects of whiteness (Sullivan 2014, 20). Sullivan argues this is a symptom of ontological 
expansiveness that must be resisted, and that one way to do so is to stay home. Still, it is unclear 
to me that Sullivan’s following claim, that whiteness alone can be “a legitimate social location or 
identity from which to challenge white racism” totally solves the problem (2014, 21). It is true 
that failing to acknowledge one’s subject position and privilege as a white person is a failing in 
the methodology of resisting white racism–and so, in this way, whiteness is a legitimate location 
as Sullivan indicates. However, without a proper understanding of oneself and oneself in relation 
to different others, as well as the perspectives of those others, it seems unlikely that the white 
person can adequately and appropriately do the work of critically examining whiteness. In fact, 
in a culture still so fraught with racial inequalities, white people cannot even fully understand 
and deconstruct their preferences (and how they may be adaptively formed) without a broader 
understanding of these social relations. It may seem, at first, that Sullivan’s calls to action are 
franker and more forthright, but I would argue Medina is promoting epistemic obligations that 
require more from white people. In other words, staying at home20 doesn’t seem to be in his 
repertoire for resisting white privilege and epistemic injustice, because we must, instead, 
establish “relations of solidarity that bring together individuals into well-communicated social 
networks and social movements” and do the work of getting clear about our relations with others 
if we are to resist the injustices born out of them. 
Some might argue that the differences I pose between Medina’s and Sullivan’s accounts 
boil down to a dispute about integration versus separatism; however, what I am doing here is not 
making a strict recommendation for either. I think there are scenarios in which interaction 
between people is unnecessary and harmful, and scenarios in which interaction between people is 
necessary and good. Instead, what I have attempted in this paper is zeroing in on one facet of 
whiteness: the adaptive preferences born out of one’s white location in the world, formed in 
reaction to oppressive norms that favor whiteness. As I offered earlier, this is just one part of the 
self that white people must focus on during a lifetime of antiracist obligations. Medina’s account 
of the resistant imagination necessarily requires that white people do more than simply figure out 
what whiteness means on their own; instead, they must actively be in the world interacting with 
different others to truly learn about themselves. 
The active work encouraged by Medina’s account lends itself to concrete examples of 
adaptive preferences that privileged people may learn to resist. I recently shared a conversation 
with one of my good friends, whom I worked and developed a relationship with through a 
student organization in college; she has since graduated and moved to New York City where she 
works. Her relationship to feminism and social justice has blossomed over the past year, so much 
so that she began to seriously study feminist literature and critical race theory for the first time, 
all of her own volition.21 Several of our conversations over the course of this year have been 
 
20 As prescribed by Sullivan. 
21 I take this volition to be a genuine feat; I believe it is easier to remain socially aware when one is in an 
institutional environment, such as academia (which has been my driving force in learning and becoming passionate 
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about her experience with Greek life; this friend was in a sorority throughout college and her 
recent dedication to social justice has encouraged critical thought about the inequities within the 
system of sororities and fraternities at primarily white institutions. I prodded at her newfound 
criticism and questioned why she was not critical of the system while she was immediately 
benefitting from it. Because she was raised in a privileged, conservative Midwest home, college 
was not a place where she was forced to reckon with injustice. In fact, it’s fair to say her college 
experience was probably similar to mine: I have emotionally and financially supportive parents; 
I’m white, cisgender, able-bodied. As this friend and I spoke, she said, “I was in a sorority 
because I had to be–to get where I am today.” This sort of language helps reveal the nature of the 
privileged person’s APs. They are preferences that further power and privilege in some way (for 
this friend, her sorority experience made possible a connection at an internship in New York 
immediately following graduation), but often at the expense of other, marginalized people. What 
I draw from this example, and what I think is quite hopeful, is the method by which this friend 
came to a sort of meta-lucidity: by meeting (and even living with) different others in a new 
environment; by reading vigorously; by being eager to learn from the people she meets.  
There may be an argument made for intersectionality, too: there is no perfect 
quantification method for when a preference is wrong or right, when its benefits outweigh its 
harms. It is also fair, while we note the racial inequities perpetuated by Greek life, to 
simultaneously note the ways in which sororities can open doors for women entering fields 
disproportionately represented by men. There are instances in my life, as a privileged white 
woman, too, where I realize preferences I hold are perhaps a result of my status. Take buying 
clothing, for example, from companies I know do not require ethical working conditions–
because I have the means to, and because I believe my fashion taste is some specific way 
requiring some specific purchases. Or, for example, not being adamant about tipping 20 percent, 
at the very least, at restaurants to overworked, underpaid workers. After working in the service 
industry, I’ve become intentional about resisting this sort of failure. Such change was a matter of 
being in the world and learning about power through experience. Medina’s methodology for 
epistemic imaginative resistance can be applied to these examples, too, if the privileged agent at 
hand employs resistance via the imagination at the object-level (resisting some stereotype about 
service work, for example) or the meta-level (expanding, or abandoning, one’s college/Greek life 
worldview to see the world through new lenses and in new spaces)–both levels engineered, in 
part, by the dominant social imaginary one finds oneself amidst. 
My argument as a whole is a way of understanding these complexities of social 
positionality under the dominant social imaginary and its consequences. As Medina argues, our 
view ought to be “sensitive to context and to social positionality, one that rejects any one-size-
fits-all approach, and one that argues... [assessments] have to be done piecemeal, case by case, 
and not by applying the same analysis to all agents equally” (2013, 119). Such an approach 
encourages an understanding that adaptive preferences can be either harmful or beneficial, or 
both, but also that they tend to reflect the disproportionate harms oppressed groups face. Thus, 
the relevant call-to-action remains: the privileged, who “have more or stronger epistemic 
obligations given the epistemic advantages they enjoy,” should be able to better question the 
complexities of action and choice on my account (Medina 2013, 187). Doing this work, learning 
about one’s privilege and APs under the dominant social imaginary, is not brave or heroic. In 
Medina’s words, these are obligations. Note my use of learn; it is key here. Though reading is 
 
about social justice), that supports or requires such education, learning, and reading. To do so once one is out in the 
world on their own requires a level of discipline and sincerity.  
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one part of self-education I find valuable, I do not believe the most effective way to learn of (and 
unlearn) one’s racist preferences is by simply reading the prescriptions or examples laid out here. 
They rely on a greater obligation to go out in the world and actively gain understanding about 
one’s community, one’s relationship to privilege and power, and that relationship in comparison 
to others’–only then can one know one has, in good faith, understood the ways their actions, 
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